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Chief Justice McLachlin and the 
Division of Powers 
Mahmud Jamal 
I. INTRODUCTION 
These brief remarks offer a few reflections on Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
contributions to the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on the 
division of powers, based on cases where she authored or co-authored 
reasons for judgment.1 It is obviously daunting to try to comment on the 
                                                                                                              Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, Toronto. I would like to thank Jennifer Horton, an Osler 
articling student, for her excellent research assistance and for reviewing an earlier draft of these 
remarks. 
1 MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] S.C.J. No. 99, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796, at 834-35 (S.C.C.) 
(province can inquire into wrongful conviction — here, of Donald Marshall, Jr. — as part of 
administration of justice within the province); Westcoast Energy v. Canada (National Energy 
Board), [1998] S.C.J. No. 27, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 322, at paras. 108-168 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Westcoast”], dissenting (whether gas processing plants and related gathering facilities form part of 
a single interprovincial gas transportation undertaking); Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”] (federal regulations prohibiting the 
sale of young hooded and harp seals supportable under federal fisheries power but not under the 
criminal law power); R. v. Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915, at paras. 82-139 
(S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., dissenting (whether valid provincial law prohibiting hunting 
at night with an illuminating device impinges upon Aboriginal treaty right to hunt); Reference re 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] S.C.J. No. 61, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 457 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act”] (federal regulations relating to assisted human 
reproduction upheld as criminal law); NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. 
Government Service Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696, at paras. 48-81 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society”], McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., 
concurring with the majority in the result (provincial labour relations law applies to First Nations 
child welfare agency); Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child 
and Family Services of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737, at para. 13 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada”], McLachlin C.J.C. and 
Fish J., concurring in the result) (provincial labour relations law applies to First Nations child 
welfare agency); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lacombe”] (municipal zoning by-law prohibiting the construction of 
aerodromes on a lake ultra vires); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots 
Association, [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”] (provincial 
legislation limiting non-agricultural land uses constitutionally inapplicable to prohibit aerodromes in 
agricultural zones); Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. 
No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at paras. 45-73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS Community Services 
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jurisprudence of the longest-serving Chief Justice in Canadian history. 
But the task certainly repays the effort and only deepens one’s admiration 
for her many important contributions to Canadian law. In that spirit, 
these notes provide a few comments on Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
judicial philosophy and her contributions to legal federalism and legal 
education. I will argue that Chief Justice McLachlin’s federalism 
jurisprudence fairly reflects her self-described judicial philosophy as 
being scrupulously non-partisan and impartial. I will further suggest that 
her contributions to the doctrines of legal federalism, as seen in her 
interjurisdictional immunity rulings by way of example, brought greater 
stability, certainty, and clarity to the law. I will close by suggesting that 
the rigour and lucidity of her judicial writing have contributed 
significantly to legal education in Canada.  
II. JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 
One might begin by asking what Chief Justice McLachlin’s division 
of powers rulings reveal about her philosophy of the proper balance 
between the federal and provincial legislative powers. If, as Professor 
Wayne MacKay has observed, “[t]he Court’s federalism jurisprudence 
over the past 125 years [has been] marked by huge pendulum swings, 
sometimes favouring the federal government and other times favouring 
the provinces”,2 then surely it is fair to ask where Chief Justice 
McLachlin sat on the federalism spectrum. Did she tend to favour federal 
or provincial power? 
The question might be rejected out of hand as being antithetical to the 
judicial role. The Chief Justice herself described that role in traditional 
terms, as being an “independent arbiter”, one who must determine “what 
falls to the federal government under section 91 and what falls to the 
                                                                                                             
Society” or “Insite”] (federal criminal law constitutionally applicable to provincial safe injection 
site); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, [2013] 1 
S.C.R. 623, at paras. 129-132 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. and Karakatsanis J. (declining to consider 
as moot whether Manitoba statutes related to the implementation of the Manitoba Act were ultra 
vires); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, at paras. 
128-152 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”] (s. 35 framework displaces interjurisdictional immunity 
in evaluating provincial encroachments on land held under Aboriginal title); and Grassy Narrows 
First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), [2014] S.C.J. No. 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447, at para. 53 
(S.C.C.) (interjurisdictional immunity does not preclude a province from justifiably infringing 
Aboriginal treaty rights). 
2 A. Wayne MacKay, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Federalism: Does\Should 
Anyone Care Anymore?” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 241, at 253. 
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provinces under section 92” of the Constitution Act, 1867.3 Such a 
determination must be made, she noted, “fairly and impartially in a 
nonpartisan fashion; on the basis of the law, the materials and the 
pleadings before [the court].”4 Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice 
emphasized that, “[u]nlike politicians, judges do not have agendas. They 
take the law and the cases as they find them and apply their interpretive 
skills to them as the constitution requires.” This, she added, “is a legal 
task; indeed, it is judging of the highest level.”5 Thus, as a judge, Chief 
Justice McLachlin says that she has tried “not to think about things in too 
strategic a manner” — her job has been “simply to listen to what the 
parties have to say, and to do my best to understand the position, the 
ramifications of deciding one way or the other, to think about what’s best 
for Canadian society on this particular problem that’s before us ….”6 
But if the question of where Chief Justice McLachlin sat on the 
federalism spectrum may be asked, what do her decisions show? Did 
they tend to favour federal or provincial power? On examination, her 
decisions reveal no consistent pattern — except, perhaps, to confirm her 
self-described approach to judging: deciding one case at a time, without a 
larger agenda or strategy. To quote Joseph Brean, writing in the National 
Post, “for every grasp at an ideological decryption of her work, a 
counter-example announces itself”.7 Thus, McLachlin C.J.C.’s decisions 
include rulings:  
 that took an expansive view of the federal criminal law power, to 
support regulations for assisted human reproduction,8 but that also 
adopted a much narrower view of the same power, to not support 
regulations prohibiting the sale of baby seals;9 
                                                                                                             
3 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”]. Chief Justice Beverley 
McLachlin, “The judiciary’s distinctive role in our constitutional democracy” Policy Options 
(September 1, 2003), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/canadian-universities/the-
judiciarys-distinctive-role-in-our-constitutional-democracy/>. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Joseph Brean, “‘Conscious objectivity’: That’s how the chief justice defines the top court’s 
role. Harper might beg to differ” National Post (May 23, 2015), online: <http://nationalpost. 
com/news/conscious-objectivity-thats-how-the-chief-justice-defines-the-top-courts-role-harper-might-
beg-to-differ>. 
7 Id. 
8 Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra, note 1.  
9 Ward, supra, note 1.  
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 that permitted provinces to regulate what was claimed to be a single 
integrated federal transportation undertaking,10 but that also resisted 
a municipality’s attempt to do so, in declaring ultra vires a municipal 
prohibition of aerial transportation facilities within the municipality;11 
and 
 that applied the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, in holding that 
a province could not regulate the location of aerodromes within the 
province,12 but also refused to apply that doctrine, in holding that 
provincial labour relations law applied to a First Nations child 
welfare agency,13 and in finding federal criminal law applied to a 
health care facility.14 
Similar examples abound. In this realm, as in so many others, Chief 
Justice McLachlin’s decisions resist being pigeonholed. Instead, they 
fairly reflect her self-described judicial philosophy as being scrupulously 
non-partisan and impartial, deciding one case at a time. 
III. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DOCTRINES OF LEGAL FEDERALISM 
What, then, might be said of the Chief Justice’s substantive 
contributions to the jurisprudence? In his insightful analysis of the first 
decade of the McLachlin Court’s contributions to federalism, Professor 
Peter Oliver observed that the last quarter-century or so has seen a 
“stabilization in the interpretation of the federal heads of powers” — 
leading him to ask, somewhat provocatively, whether “legal federalism is 
the constitutional equivalent of medieval history, in which new 
discoveries and new developments are few and far between?”15 In 
Professor Oliver’s view, “despite the relative stability in the interpretation 
                                                                                                             
10 Westcoast, supra, note 1, at paras. 108-168, dissenting. 
11 Lacombe, supra, note 1 (municipal zoning by-law prohibiting the construction of 
aerodromes on a lake within the municipality ultra vires). 
12 COPA, supra, note 1 (provincial legislation limiting non-agricultural land uses 
constitutionally inapplicable to prohibit aerodromes in agricultural zones). 
13 NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society, supra, note 1, at paras. 48-81, McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Fish J., concurring with the majority in the result; Communications, Energy and 
Paperworkers Union of Canada, supra, note 1, at para. 13, McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., concurring 
in the result. 
14 PHS Community Services Society, supra, note 1, at paras. 45-73. 
15 Peter C. Oliver, “The Busy Harbours of Canadian Federalism: The Division of Powers 
and Its Doctrines in the McLachlin Court” in David A. Wright & Adam M. Dodek, eds., Public Law 
at the McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), 167-200, at 169. 
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of the division of power, there is a still a good deal of important activity 
in the field of legal federalism”, in revisions, clarifications, and 
refinements of the various doctrines of legal federalism. These include 
the pith and substance analysis, as well as the doctrines of double aspect, 
ancillary powers, paramountcy, and interjurisdictional immunity — all of 
which are aimed at “the encouragement of cooperative federalism”, in 
which “legislation is generally upheld and disputes allocated to the 
intergovernmental process”.16 
While Chief Justice McLachlin made many important contributions to 
the doctrines of legal federalism, I’d like to address, by way of example, 
three relating to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity — the 
doctrine under which a valid law of general application enacted by one 
level of government is “read down” as constitutionally inapplicable 
where it “impairs” the protected core of jurisdiction of the other level of 
government. They are: first, the proper test for “impairment” under 
interjurisdictional immunity; second, the recognition that interjurisdictional 
immunity is “reciprocal”, in that not just the federal government but also 
the provinces can claim immunity from the laws of the other level of 
government; and lastly, the relationship between interjurisdictional 
immunity and Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. 
Shortly after the Court’s decision in Canadian Western Bank,17 the 
Chief Justice clarified the proper test for impairment. As is well known, 
in 2007 the Court in Canadian Western Bank elevated the test for 
interjurisdictional immunity from a relatively low threshold of merely 
“affecting” a protected “core” of the jurisdiction of the other level of 
government, to one that insisted upon a higher standard of “impairment”. 
But there remained uncertainty as to how impairment was to be 
established. That issue came before the Court just three years later, in 
Lacombe and COPA, where the Court had to decide whether a provincial 
                                                                                                             
16 Id., at 169, 199. See also P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. 
(Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 5-46 [hereinafter “Hogg”], cited in Quebec 
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 14, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 693, at 
para. 17 (S.C.C.), referring to cooperative federalism as a “descriptive concept” that describes the 
“network of relationships between the executives of the central and regional governments [through 
which] mechanisms are developed, especially fiscal mechanisms, which allow a continuous 
redistribution of powers and resources without recourse to the courts”; Kate Glover, “Structural 
Cooperative Federalism” (2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 45-66, at 47, 53 (cooperative federalism as a legal 
or interpretative principle); and Eric M. Adams, “Judging the Limits of Cooperative Federalism” 
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 27-43, at 30 (cooperative federalism as a constitutional metaphor). 
17 Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]. 
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law could regulate the location of aerodromes within a province.18 In 
finding the provincial law to be constitutionally inapplicable, McLachlin 
C.J.C. for the majority held that the focus of the impairment inquiry 
“must be on the power itself”;19 that is, on “whether the core of the 
legislative power has been impaired, not whether or how Parliament has, 
in fact chosen to exercise that power.”20 Put another way, as McLachlin 
C.J.C. noted, the issue is whether the impugned law would result “in an 
unacceptable narrowing of Parliament’s legislative options.”21 By 
focusing on the legislative power, rather than the impact of the provincial 
law on particular federal activities, McLachlin C.J.C. emphasized that 
impairment is primarily a legal test — one that examines a law’s impact 
on the legislative powers of the other level of government — and not 
primarily a factual or evidentiary test. 
This focus of the impairment analysis has significant legal and 
practical implications for the stability of the division of powers and legal 
certainty. If the focus is the particular evidence before a given court, then 
the same legislation could be constitutionally applicable one day, based 
on a particular factual record, but inapplicable another day, based on 
different evidence. This is exactly the concern identified 30 years ago in 
Bell Canada, where Beetz J. remarked that “I think it is clear that the 
courts could not be asked to decide on a case by case basis at what point 
there is impairment.”22 
Stability and legal certainty were also promoted in PHS Community 
Services Society — the Insite safe injection clinic case — which 
confirmed that interjurisdictional immunity is reciprocal and can be 
invoked by either level of government. In this instance, however, 
McLachlin C.J.C. resisted a province’s call to exempt this health clinic 
from federal criminal laws relating to controlled substances.23 While the 
case was ultimately decided under section 7 of the Charter, the Court also 
considered whether the federal measures impaired the core of the 
                                                                                                             
18 Lacombe, above, note 1; COPA, above, note 1. 
19 COPA, supra, note 1, at para. 48. 
20 Id., at para. 52 (emphasis in original). 
21 Lacombe, supra, note 1, at para. 66. 
22 Bell Canada v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), 
[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, at 864 (S.C.C.). See, however, the later decision of 
Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 467, at 
para. 71 (S.C.C.) (Wagner and Côté JJ. for the majority), at para. 121 (Gascon J. concurring in the 
result), where the Court appears to have placed greater emphasis on evidence of the actual impact of 
an impugned provincial law on a federal telecommunications undertaking and its activities than on 
the impact on Parliament’s exclusive legislative power to regulate telecommunications. 
23 PHS Community Services Society, supra, note 1. 
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provincial power over health care — an argument that had been accepted 
by a majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal. Chief Justice 
McLachlin rejected this view, instead urging a cautious, limited recourse 
to interjurisdictional immunity. While she recognized that the doctrine 
had recently fallen out of favour, she underscored that “[p]redictability, 
important to the proper functioning of the division of powers, requires 
recognition of previously established cores of power.”24 But McLachlin 
C.J.C. noted that as the courts had never identified a core of the “broad 
and extensive” provincial health power — which “extends to thousands 
of activities and to a host of different venues” — she reasoned that such a 
“vast core” would “sit ill with the restrained application of the doctrine 
called for by the jurisprudence.”25 Preventing criminal law from applying 
to provincial health care facilities would, McLachlin C.J.C. concluded, 
“disturb settled competencies and introduce uncertainties for new ones.”26 
Insite will likely remain an important division of powers case because 
it was the first time a province had invoked interjurisdictional immunity 
against a federal law27 — which perhaps also underscores how 
asymmetrical the doctrine had become.28 Chief Justice McLachlin 
seemed willing to apply the doctrine in a province’s favour in an 
appropriate case, despite the absence of precedent. And, even though 
some viewed the doctrine as largely moribund after Canadian Western 
Bank, Insite underscores that it will inevitably survive, albeit restrained 
in application. 
Lastly, the Chief Justice’s ground-breaking reasons in Tsilhqot’in 
clarified the relationship between interjurisdictional immunity and 
Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982.29 The Court held that federal or provincial attempts to regulate 
lands held under Aboriginal title must not be evaluated under 
interjurisdictional immunity, but rather, under the Sparrow justification 
framework in section 35.30 This issue arose because interjurisdictional 
immunity and section 35 provide incompatible ways for evaluating 
legislative infringements of Aboriginal rights. Interjurisdictional immunity 
                                                                                                             
24 Id., at para. 65. 
25 Id., at para. 68. 
26 Id., at para. 70. 
27 See Hogg, supra, note 16, at 15-38.7. 
28 Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 17, at para. 35. 
29  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
30 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.). The Sparrow test 
asks whether the infringement is reasonable, imposes an undue hardship, and denies the holders of 
the right their preferred means of exercising the right. 
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assumes that an Aboriginal right is at the core of federal jurisdiction 
over “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians”,31 and then renders 
inapplicable any legislative encroachment, however reasonable or 
justified it might otherwise be. In contrast, the Sparrow framework 
focuses on the reasonableness of the legislative encroachment. The 
result, McLachlin C.J.C. noted, is “dueling tests directed at answering 
the same question: how far can provincial governments go in regulating 
the exercise of s. 35 Aboriginal rights?”32 Chief Justice McLachlin 
solved this conundrum by clarifying that, like rights guaranteed under the 
Charter, Aboriginal rights protected under section 35 are “held against 
government — they operate to prohibit certain types of regulation which 
government could otherwise impose.” As she explained, “[t]hese limits 
have nothing to do with whether something lies at the core of the federal 
government’s powers.”33 
In short, Tsilhqot’in established, for the first time, that the 
interjurisdictional immunity paradigm simply does not apply where 
section 35 rights are at issue. By affirming the role of the Sparrow test, 
the result, McLachlin C.J.C. noted, is “to protect Aboriginal and treaty 
rights while also allowing the reconciliation of Aboriginal interests with 
those of the broader society”.34 
Thus, in each of these three very different rulings, Chief Justice 
McLachlin’s reasons brought greater stability, certainty, and clarity to the 
doctrines of legal federalism. 
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEGAL EDUCATION 
While Chief Justice McLachlin made many important contributions to 
division of powers doctrines, it may be that her most important and 
durable one in this realm has been to legal education — by teaching this 
important area of Canadian law to the innumerable readers of her 
decisions, whether they be law students, lawyers, judges or members of 
the public. The Chief Justice is rightly revered as an exceptional jurist in 
part because of the clarity of her writing and her ability to expose 
complex ideas in accessible terms. She is well-known for distilling 
tangled areas of the law in a few paragraphs, leaving for posterity a 
                                                                                                             
31 Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 3, s. 91(24), cited in Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 1, at 
paras. 103 and 129. 
32 Tsilhqot’in, id., at para. 146. 
33 Id., at para. 142 (emphasis in original). 
34 Id., at paras. 138-139. 
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succinct guide for traversing a thicket of often inconsistent cases. Her 
reasons can be counted on to bring coherence and order to the law. Her 
students — and we are all her students — always leave with a clearer and 
more principled understanding of the law.  
Undoubtedly, the rigour and clarity of Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
judicial writing have contributed significantly to legal education in 
Canada. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Inevitably these brief remarks have only scratched the surface of 
Chief Justice McLachlin’s many contributions to the division of powers. 
These include her non-partisan and impartial judicial philosophy, her 
substantive clarifications to the doctrines of legal federalism, and her 
important and lasting contributions to Canadian legal education. A deep 
store of learning and thinking resides in this part of her work, a rich 
jurisprudence that will continue to provide guidance in this important 
field of Canadian constitutional law. 
 
